Mushrooming Like Coronavirus? Tackling the menace of Fake news by way of an Epistemic, Legal and Regulatory Discourse by Shankar, Aayush
1 
 
MUSHROOMING LIKE CORONAVIRUS? TACKLING THE MENACE OF FAKE 
NEWS BY WAY OF AN EPISTEMIC, LEGAL & REGULATORY DISCOURSE 
AAYUSH1 
Fake news is a topic that we all know well, and that continues to play a prominent role in 
the social harms besieging the globe today. From the recent storming of the Capitol Hill in 
the United States to the siege of Red fort over Farm-laws in India, online disinformation via 
social media platforms was the main driving force catapulting the protestors far and wide.  
In the backdrop of such social harms, this Research Article examines the epistemic, legal and 
regulatory discourse surrounding the disinformation bubble in India and asks for the 
deployment of ‘Lessing’s Decentred Regulatory Model’ — the potential Framework solution 
to regulate social media platforms in order to curb the menace of ‘fake news’.  
KEY-WORDS: FAKE NEWS, EPISTEMOLOGY, FOUCAULT, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 
INFORMATION REGULATION, SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS, REGULATORY HARBOUR MODEL 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
II. FAKE NEWS – CONCEPT & EPISTEMIC FEATURES ....................................... 3 
III. WHY REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS IS NECESSARY?    ………………  
………………………………………………………………………………………………....................6 
A. EXPLOITATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DRIVES ...............................................  6 
B. PROMOTION OF NEO-LIBERAL LOGICS OF CONTROL ...................................... 7 
C. MITIGATION OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH ............................................................ 9 
D. COLLAPSE OF TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES, INSTITUTIONS & FALL OF DEMOCRACY
 11 
                                                                
1 Aayush is a Law Graduate (2020) of Symbiosis Law School, NOIDA. The views of the author in this article are 




IV. LEGAL REMEDIES: REGULATION OF FAKE NEWS ......................................... 13 
A. POWER TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT FAKE NEWS ......................................... 13 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINE - RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL SPEECH
 15 
C. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY - RESONABLE RESTRICTION TO FREE SPEECH AND 
EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19 ..................................................................... 18 
V. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES - OVERVIEW ....................... 17 
VI. PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK – LESSIG’S ‘DECENTRED’ APPROACH TO 
REGULATION ...................................................................................................... 22 
A. REGULATORY DESIGN & NORMATIVE APPROACH ....................................... 20 
B. ROLES OF INTERVENING AGENTS ............................................................. 24 
C. DYNAMIC WORKING OF FRAMEWORK: LESSING’S REGULATORY HARBOUR MODEL 25 
VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 25 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 6, hours after Donald’s Trump false representations via Social Media 
Platforms (‘SMP’), armed and angry mob of supporters stormed the Capitol Hill and 
tangled with the Police just as Joe Biden’s presidential win was about to be validated 
in the United States.2 Pro-trump supporters crashed barricades and masquerade 
into the halls of Capitol building, smashing windows and brawling with police 
officers.3 This was considered as the worst security breach in the U.S History.4 
Twitter responded by announcing5 a 12 hour suspension of President’s Donald 
                                                                
2 Neil Vigdor, 'Today’s Rampage at the Capitol, As It Happened' (Nytimes.com, 2021) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/01/06/us/washington-dc-protests#mitt-romney-says-trump-incited-an-
insurrection-at-the-capitol> accessed 21  February 2021. 
3 Ibid. 
4 'US Capitol Hill Siege, Explained: What Happened, Who Was Involved And Is Trump To Blame?' (The Indian 
Express, 2021) (<https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/us-capitol-hill-siege-explained-7136632/> accessed 21 
February 2021). 
5 <https://twitter.com/TwitterSafety/status/1346970431039934464> accessed 21 February 2021. 
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Trump’s handle while Facebook and Instgram banned6 the President’s profile for 
the rest of his term. Youtube also restricted accounts that posted videos containing 
false information about the election.7   
Similarly, in another incident in India, allegations of ideological interference in the 
Farm-Laws protest gained increased currency when protestors stormed the iconic 
monument of Red Fort and added fuel to the speculations of the growing threat to 
free speech and democracy in India.8 The Government of India responded to the 
growing online movement by asking twitter to block certain handles.9 After 
unreleting for a while10 (3 take-down notices by the Government), twitter finally 
caved in to the pressure from the Indian Government and blocked over 500 accounts 
in an unprecedented move.11 
These two contrasting instances depict the enforcement actions adopted by the SMP 
in response to misinformation issues, which raise questions about their role, 
worldwide reach – and responsibility. In the backdrop of such increasing instances 
of misinformation representations, SMP will need to embrace the nature & gravity 
                                                                
6 Guy Rosen and Monika Bickert, 'Our Response to the Violence in Washington - About Facebook' (About 
Facebook, 2021) <https://about.fb.com/news/2021/01/responding-to-the-violence-in-washington-dc/> accessed 21 
February 2021. 
7 <https://twitter.com/YouTubeInsider/status/1347231471212371970> accessed 21 February 2021. 
8 AL JAZEERA, 'Free Speech under Threat as India Clamps down on Farmer Protests' (2021) <https: 
//www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/5/free-speech-under-threat-as-india-clamps-down-on-farmer-protests.> 
accessed 21 February 2021. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Twitter Safety, 'Updates on Our Response to Blocking Orders from the Indian Government' 
<https://blog.twitter.com/en_in/topics/company/2020/twitters-response-indian-government.html> accessed 21 
February 2021. 
11 Aashish Aryan, 'In Fresh Notice, Govt Asks Twitter To Block 1200 Accounts ‘Flagged As Khalistan 
Sympathisers or Backed By Pakistan’' The Indian Express (2021)   
<https://indianexpress.com/article/india/twitter-accounts-block-govt-notice-khalistan-sympathiser-pakistan-
7179728/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
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of the proliferation of harmful information online, perpetuating through their 
enclosures that can lead to monumental social harms.  
Through this Research Article, I will firstly draw out the concept and the epistemic 
features of the phenomenon of ‘fake news’. Having done that, I will then discuss the 
different facets of social harms associated with ‘fake news’; categorically laying 
down the reasons, which necessitate the Regulation of SMP. Taking a pro-
regulatory approach as point of departure, I will then explore the avenues through 
which it can be achieved. This would require me to evaluate whether the organs of 
Indian State can derive powers from the Constitution to regulate or prohibit the 
proliferation of ‘fake news’? After determining the requisite legislative and the 
judicial avenues, I then proceed to map out an overview of regulatory approaches 
and challenges for the regulation of social media platforms. I conclude by proposing 
Lessing’s Decentred Dynamic Model as the model framework for the regulation of 
SMP that takes into account the architectural limitations of technology, and is 
equally responsive to change. While doing so, I also discuss its normative and 
functional aspects, deeming it as the most potent regulatory model that could 
eradicate the menace of ‘fake news’ right from its roots.  
II. FAKE NEWS – CONCEPT & EPISTEMIC FEATURES  
It is said that when we lie, we place the recipient in the lower pedestal than our own 
selves.12  The term, ‘‘fake news’’, when spoken in its historical context, raises a 
certain kind of scepticism. This could be due to the political climate, vagueness and 
a certain inadequacy of the term.13 So, what constitutes ‘fake news’? Are honest 
                                                                
12 See Christine Korsgaard, 'Two Arguments Against Lying' (1988) 2 Argumentation 
<https://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.Two.Args.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021. 
13 C. Wardle and H. Derakhshan, ‘Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research 
and Policymaking’, Council of Europe report DGI (2017) <https://rm.coe.int/ information-disorder-toward-an-
5 
 
reporting errors also considered ‘fake news’? Perhaps not! The most fundamental 
ingredient that pervades ‘fake news’ is intentional deception; honest reporting is 
not considered ‘fake news’.14 When HINDU tweeted an article titled, “Coronavirus: 
Wuhan Institute’s study on bats and bat hunters in Nagaland to be probed” which in 
fact referred to a study on Filo virus, this was not ‘fake news’.15 More so because 
when independent fact-checking organisations pointed this out to the editor of 
Hindu, he acknowledged the mistaken headline for its web edition report and then 
carried out a subsequent correction with a disclaimer.16 ‘Fake news’ is not merely 
misleading; it involves deception. This deception is targeted towards an audience 
larger than the immediate recipient with the presumed expectation of a cumulative 
network effect.17 In certain instances, the creators of ‘fake news’ employ deception 
at least on marginal scales as an instrumental recourse to some other larger end.18 
To take another example, a doctored video showing how China is bombing its own 
citizens in Wuhan was widely shared and transmitted across twitter.19 For the 
transmission of ‘fake news’, it is vital that a large number of people share the click-
                                                                
interdisciplinary-framework-for research/168076277c> accessed 21 February 2021; European Association for 
Viewers Interests, ‘Infographic: Beyond Fake News – Ten Types of Misleading News – Nine Languages’ 
<https://eavi.eu/beyond-fake-news-10-types misleading-info/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
14  Regina Rini, 'Fake News And Partisan Epistemology' (2017) 27 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 43-63 
<https://kiej.georgetown.edu/fake-news-partisan-epistemology/> accessed 21 February 2021 (Hereinafter Regina 
Rini). 
15 Archis Chowdhury, 'The Hindu Article Erroneously Links Filo virus Study to Coronavirus (Boom Live 2020) 
<https://www.boomlive.in/fake-news/the-hindu-article-erroneously-links-filovirus-study-to-coronavirus-6789> 
accessed 21 February 2021. 
16 Ibid.  
17 Regina Rini (n 13) 44. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See Jignesh Patel and Mohammed Zubair, 'Chinese Police 'Shooting Down' Coronavirus Patients? 
Manufactured Clip Viral - Alt News' (Alt News, 2021) <https://www.altnews.in/chinese-police-shooting-down-
coronavirus-patients manufactured-clip-viral/> accessed 21 February 2021. 
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bait link and this can only happen if some of them believe in the truth value of the 
story.20  
This leads me to pose the vital question: Why do people believe in ‘fake news’? 
People believe in ‘fake news’ because on most occasions, they learn it through their 
networks on social media. Sharing information on social media already has the 
effect of reducing critical rationality21 and this is further amplified when the testifier 
belongs to their own affiliates. This is because information obtained from affiliates 
or networks acts as de facto testimony22 that has the effect of granting more 
credibility to the information than would otherwise be ascribed. A person is much 
more likely to believe the testimony from someone who is regarded as an epistemic 
peer.23 A community of people who accept each other’s testimony learn more than 
the sceptic individual who arrives at information on his or her own volition.24 SMP 
offer individuals (‘nodes in the information assemblage’) to accept bent form of 
testimonies.25 The algorithms of the platform on the basis of the online behavioural 
pattern of its subjects also enable them to construct their ethos through reflection 
and reactivation of their prevailing epistemic attitudes.26  People believe what they 
want to believe in. This goes against modernity’s de-subjectivating and objective 
brand of truth-seeking.27 The truth doesn’t matter anymore. The platform dynamics 
                                                                
20 Regina Rini (n 13) 45.  
21 See generally Herbert Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology’ (1941) 9 Studies in Philosophy 
and Social Sciences 138-162   
<https://courses.cs.washington.edu/courses/cse490e/19wi/readings/marcuse_social_implications_1941.pdf> 
accessed 22 February 2021 (Hereinafter Marcuse). 
22 Regina Rini (n 13) 1. 
23 See generally CAJ Coady and Boyce Gibson, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Clarendon Press 1992) 
(Hereinafter Testimony). 
24 Regina Rini (n 13) 46. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Rickyd’Andrea Crano, 'Neoliberal Epistemology and the Truth in Fake news (self-writing/self-enterprise/self-




also promote the proliferation of confirmation bias among its subjects.28 This 
confirmation bias occurs due to the intellectual laziness and naive skepticism of its 
subjects.29 
Moreover, certain SMP promote the use of ‘false amplifiers’ which uses fake 
accounts to push rapid, repeated posts for ideological & financial motives.30 This 
provides a breeding ground for the proliferation of misinformation.31 The promotion 
and push for ideologies via SMP raises the epiphany – is any information completely 
objective & free from the dictates of ideology? Is ‘fake news’ a source or else is it a 
reaction to the world’s absurdity? 
Regardless of such abstract concerns, to tackle the menace of ‘fake news’, a 
pragmatic approach would be to regulate the SMP. In this ensuing section, I will 
discuss the various social harms associated with ‘fake news’ while also laying down 
the reasons that necessitate its regulation. 
III. WHY REGULATION OF FAKE NEWS IS NECESSARY? 
A. EXPLOITATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL DRIVES 
In Greek Mythology, Narcissus who was renowned for his radiance, was provoked by 
Nemesis to a still pool in which he saw his own reflection in the water and was 
                                                                
28 Cass R Sunstein. Republic.com 2.0. (Princeton University Press, 2007) <www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7tbsw> 
accessed 21 Feb 2021. 
29 Penny cook, Gordon and Rand, David G., ‘Lazy, Not Biased: Susceptibility to Partisan Fake News Is Better 
Explained by Lack of Reasoning than by Motivated Reasoning’ (2018) 188 Cognition 39-50 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3165567> accessed 21 Feb 2021. 
30 See Irini Katsirea, ' “Fake news”: reconsidering the value of untruthful expression in the face of Regulatory 
Uncertainty' (2018) 10(2) Journal of Media Law <10.1080/17577632.2019.1573569> accessed 21 February 2021 
(Hereinafter Irini Kastsirea). 
31 Tambuscio Marcella and others,'Fact-checking Effect on Viral Hoaxes: A Model of Misinformation Spread in 
Social Networks' (2015) in Proceedings of the 24th ACM International Conference on World Wide Web 
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2740908.2742572> accessed 21 February 2021.  
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enchanted by it, not realising it was merely an image.32 Infatuated with the allure of 
his reflection, Narcissus lost his will to live.33 Similarly, SMP possess the same 
alluring capacities instigating people to often dig deeper beyond their physical 
identities in order to make sense of themselves and the communities wherein they 
form their self-identities.34 The Hedonistic pleasure offered by SMP cause automatic 
and instinctive reactions in people by further creating a habit of cyclic usage pattern 
that erodes self-control. The reflexivity offered by these platforms also generates 
feelings of anticipation and arousal by the way in which it manipulates us in 
responding as though what it depicts is real and about to be ours that also makes it 
pleasurable. For example, the desire to share what I may be eating is caused by 
performity and generates the affective capacity to excite us as if it were food itself.35 
Any manipulative action consists of targeted but careless influence on someone.36 
The subtle manipulative cues inherent in the architecture of these platforms enable 
us to extend & reproduce our familiar lived reality over time.37 The manipulation is 
apparent because these platforms maximise consumptive behaviour while hiding 
the reasons for such behaviour.38 The course of such an extension leads to the 
                                                                
32 See Timothy Gantz, Early Greek Myth: A Guide to Literary and Artistic Sources (The Johns Hopkins University 
Press 1996). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Laura Scaife, 'Learning from the Laws of the Sea, Foucault and Regulatory Theory: Proposing a Regulatory 
Harbour Model for the Regulation of Social Media that Serves Rather than Rules the Waves' [2018] 69(4) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 433-73  
<https://nilq.qub.ac.uk/index.php/nilq/article/view/187/143> accessed 21 February 2021 (Hereinafter Regulatory 
Harbour Theory). 
35 Marcus Gilroy-ware, Filling the Void: Emotion, Capitalism and Social media (Repeater 2017) 95 (Hereinafter Filling 
the void). 
36Michael Klenk, ‘Digital Well-Being and Manipulation Online’ in Luciano Floridi and Christopher Burr (eds.), 
Ethics of Digital Well-Being (Springer, Cham 2020) 3 (Hereinafter Digital Well-Being). 
37 See Alfano, Mark, J. Adam Carter, and Marc Cheong, “Technological Seduction and Self-Radicalization.” (2018) 
4 (3) 298–322 Journal of the American Philosophical Association <https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.27> accessed 21 
February 2021. 
38 Digital Well-Being (n 35). 
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expansion of our virtual self, while our real lived reality takes a back-seat. The 
glorification of the virtual avatar simultaneously leads to the dilution of our real 
sense of self. We direct our beliefs towards ourselves, i.e. “I as active subject”, 
without God and without Master”. During the course of such architectural 
manipulation, the objective truth becomes a scapegoat and consequently this leads 
to the emergence of phenomena of the proliferation of ‘fake news’.  
This architectural aspect of SMP thereby raises the quintessential question: Will a 
regulatory approach tackle consumptive use of social media? The benefit of such an 
approach would ensure that the problem of ‘fake news’ is eradicated from its roots.  
B. PROMOTION OF NEO-LIBERAL LOGICS OF CONTROL 
Hayek posited that the function of market societies is to not to distribute goods but 
information - knowledge without resorting to any hierarchal source.39 In his essays 
in the Counter-Revolution of Science set in the 1940s, he ridicules the 
modernization shaping the industrialisation in Europe and instead focuses on the 
rise of elite set of technocrats, politicians, and business magnates who ultimately 
dictate the social distribution of resources, bodies and information in accord with 
their models. Detesting the market socialist positions of his time, he takes 
neoliberalism outside the contours of ‘reason’ and goes on to conceptualize 
something called the Human Capital Theory (‘HCT’).  
The core idea of his model is that in HCT, the subject is established in a complex 
relationship with society’s market regulators.40 Interestingly, the Market is in 
                                                                
39 See FA Hayek, 'Competition as a discovery procedure' (2002) 5(3) The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics<http://faculty.citadel.edu/sobel/ENTR301/5.%20Hayek%20%20Competition%20as%20a%20Discovery%
20Procedure.pdf> accessed 21 February 2021. 
40 Michael Foucault, ‘The Hermeneutics of the Subject’ (1981-82) in Frédéric Gros. Trans. Graham Burchell. 
(eds.), Lectures at the Collège de France (New York: Picador 2001) (Hereinafter Hermeneutics of Subject). 
10 
 
Human Nature.41 Investment in the areas of skill, knowledge or health by virtue of 
exercises such as vitamin consumption or media engagement are categorized as 
investment in human capital. In fact, HCT integrates any decision concerning 
allocation of subject’s leisure time into its analytical framework.42 Whether working, 
consuming, investing, spectating or surfing, the subject is actively engaged in the 
production of a “commodity” – health, well-being, attention: a life.43  
Along similar lines, Foucault’s lectures, The Hermemeutics of the Subject,44 provide 
techniques concerned with the “care of the self” in the Hellenistic paradigm i.e. 
Epicurean, Stoic & Cynical writings. Foucault dives into the relationship between the 
subject and the truth, focusing on how human Beings, as subjects, reflexively 
constitute their own selves, subjectivate as well as bind ourselves through their own 
processes of writing, listening, meditating, truth-telling, and returning to 
ourselves.45  
Foucault’s reading of Hellenistic-Roman model of subjectivities & Hayek’s HCT is 
relevant to the Misinformation Debate today. In the Hellenistic-Roman Model, the 
experience of subject takes place through a “teleological concentration”.46 Repeated 
inscriptions on the page, on the mind and on the body, subjectivates the truth.47 A 
very crude example would be self-affirmative techniques to harness self-belief. This 
Hellensitic-Roman Model, where truth is not about what one knows but rather 
                                                                
41 See Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1991). 
42 Gary S Becker, 'A Theory of the Allocation of Time' (1965) 75 (299) The Economic Journal 
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2228949> accessed 21 February 2021. 
43 Hermeneutics of Subject (n 39). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Hermeneutics of Subject (n 39). 
46 Neoliberal Epistemology (n 25). 
47 Hermeneutics of Subject (n 39). 
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which prescribes an action or response, is renewed today where SMP like Twitter, 
Facebook & Instagram provide individuals for writing themselves through digital 
telematic self-writing: the “share” and the “retweet”. Earlier, it was done through 
activities like painting, reading and writing, while today it has taken the form of 
sharing information on SMP within their enclosures of Neo-liberal control systems 
enabling its subjects to invest in themselves. The subject constructs its identity as 
an acquisitive assemblage, which besides illustrating the consumptive habit of self-
production also sustain the world’s largest and most profitable Capitalistic 
Corporations. Retweets or shares are less about endorsements and are more of a 
statement of the presence of digital self.  
Moreover, SMP are premised on the neo-liberal logic, perpetuating Hayek’s HCT 
that if people are lonely, unhappy, horny, or whatever it could be, it is more easy to 
sell things, even if these “solutions” are anything but.48  
C. MITIGATION OF OBJECTIVE TRUTH  
In Greek terms, Social Media subjects’ construct their ethos through reactivation of 
a particular attitude or a statement of revolt against modernity’s objective brand of 
truth-seeking.49 Essentially, these platforms are enabling subjects to expel their 
version of truth, something that they or others could act upon into the fabric of 
Digital Reality via engagements. These platforms supplicate the Hellenistic-Roman 
culture of seeing the self as end in itself, as something that must be worked upon, 
reactivated and carried out.50 In the final analysis, the consequence of such a 
telematic subjectivity is the inhibition & investment of a group-subject that serves 
                                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid.  
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the proprietary algorithms of capitalist social media.  The assimilations and 
repetitions of truth, in the event that  ‘fake news’ is shared serve as preparation of 
life in the aggregate, i.e. the collective online activity of the hive-mind or the flock 
which does not need a forefront leader to guide the actions of each member. The 
algorithms ensure that the most impressive idea wins at the expense of objectivity. 
As pointed out above, critical rationality is replaced by technological rationality that 
encourages bent testimony.51 Let’s take a hypothetical example – I believe that 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi threatened to kick Rahul Gandhi out of the country 
in a campaign rally. My belief is false; Modi never said that. But I believed it because 
I saw the headline circulating in my twitter feed. My belief is based on the testimony; 
I believe it because it was painted as true by my friend who shared it on twitter. So, 
can I say that my friend made that assertion? Can a retweet be considered as an 
endorsement?  
Again this would depend on something known as incentives.52 For instance, consider 
a situation: a person on the street corner is handing out printed pamphlets of a 
coaching centre. Should I assume that this person believes the tall factual claims of 
the coaching centre? It depends. If this person is taking payment, then probably not; 
Sales person don’t necessarily believe in much of what they sell. On the other hand, 
if the person is not being compensated, then it is reasonable to assume that they 
believe the contents of what they are handing out.  
                                                                
51 Marcuse (n 51); See also Aayush, 'Techno-Philosophy | Are Human Beings Reduced to mere interfaces in the 
Eco-system’ (Per Pro Schema, 18th March 2020) <https://medium.com/per-pro-schema/techno-philosophy-are-
human-beings-reduced-to-mere-interfaces-in-the-ecosystem-43ca13a7dfb5> accessed 22 February 2021. 
52 See generally, Donella Meadows, Thinking in Systems (Chelsea Green Publishing Co 2015) 158; See also Deborah 
Stone, Policy Paradox – The Art of Political Decision (2nd ed., W W Norton & Co 2001) 271 (Hereinafter Policy Paradox). 
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However, in the world of social media, these epistemic norms are unstable.53 What 
usually happens is that the subjects of social media conveniently assert the contents 
of whatever they share if it turns out to be true or else if it gains traction; on the other 
hand, they claim no such responsibility when any trouble emerges.54 Regardless of 
such dichotomy, we usually tolerate such instabilities. Therefore, it can be safely 
said that the instability of these norms encourage bent testimony. Such bent 
testimony has the causal effect of deadening people’s normal application of 
consistency with the world.55 Prior to the advent of SMP, stories circulated through 
word of mouth.56 But something about SMP allowed an absurd story to build 
testimonial momentum till the point of its acceptance by a majority of audience.57 
This has the cumulative effect of the mitigation of objective truth.  
D. COLLAPSE OF TRADITIONAL NARRATIVES, INSTITUTIONS & FALL OF 
DEMOCRACY 
Falsehoods masquerading as truth directly reduce voter knowledge of basic facts, 
which is already on the decline.58 Especially during the election times, polarisation 
poses significant risks to social cohesion.59 This reduces trust in traditional media, 
making it difficult for true stories to have impact. Moreover, the architectural design 
of social media breeds divineness and erodes social solidarity that promotes political 
                                                                
53 Regina Rigi (n 13) 48. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See generally James Young, 'The Coherence Theory of Truth' (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Sep 3, 
1996) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence/> accessed 22 February 2021. 
56 Regina Rigi (n 13) 49. 
57 Ibid.  
58 See The economist & You Gov, the economist/You Gov poll: (December 17–20, 2016–1376 US adults 58 (2016) 
accessed 22 February 2021 >; See generally Press Release, Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. Americans Know Surprisingly 
Little about Their Government, Survey Finds (Sept. 17, 2014), <http: 
//www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/americans-know-surprisingly-little-about-their-government-
surveyfinds/.> accessed 22 February 2021. 
59 Irini Katsirea (n 29). 
14 
 
polarization.60 Political polarization is promoted by media bubbles, leading to 
environments, where individuals are not exposed to conflicting perspectives that 
challenge their existing notions and beliefs.61 The Marketing circle, with practices 
like Data Harvesting, incentivized by these platforms subsumes the political circle 
inside it.62  
As a consequence, with ‘Market Mentality’ at it’s forefront, the Role of God, Nature, 
tradition or moral imperative(s) take a back-seat.63 As grand narratives and 
institutions of modernity continue to collapse, individuals increasingly direct their 
beliefs towards themselves.64 The SMP turns its subject interminably after oneself 
by maintaining their online presence or else the algorithms will diminish one’s 
presence in the lives of others.65  
If we understand the idea of democracy as the set of conditions that enable the 
possibility of truth, then the phenomena of ‘fake news’ also poses a threat to 
democracy.66 This is because ‘fake news’ lead to the proliferation of false narratives, 
                                                                
60 See Alexandra Andorfer, Spreading Like Wildfire: Solutions for Abating the Fake News Problem on Social 
Media via Technology Controls and Government Regulation, 69 Hastings L.J. 1409 
(2018).<https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol69/iss5/5>. accessed at 22 February 2021. 
61 Terry Lee, 'The Global Rise of "Fake News" and the threat to democratic elections in the USA' (2019) 22(1) 
Public Administration and Policy: An Asia-Pacific Journal <10.1108/PAP-04-2019-0008> accessed 21 February 2021; 
EVGENY Morozov, 'Think Again: The Internet' (Think Again, 26 April 2010) 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/26/think-again-the-internet/> accessed 22 February 2021; Kalliopi 
Kyriakopoulou, 'Authoritarian states and internet social media: Instruments of democratization or instruments of 
control?' (2011) 18(26) Human Affairs <https://link.springer.com/article/10.2478%2Fs13374-011-0003-y> accessed 
21 February 2021. 
62 Luciano Floridi, 'Marketing as Control of Human Interfaces and Its Political Exploitation' (2019) 32(3) 
Philosophy & Technology 379-388 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-019-00374-7> accessed 21 February 2021. 
63 Hermeneutics of Subject (n 29) at 25. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid; See also Jannick Schou and Johan Farkas, 'Algorithms, Interfaces, and the Circulation of Information: 
Interrogating the Epistemological Challenges of Facebook' [2016] 4(1) Kome: An International Journal of Pure 
Communication Inquiry <http://dx.doi.org/10.17646/KOME.2016.13> accessed 21 February 2021. 
66 Johan Farkas, ‘Post-Truth, Fake News and Democracy: Mapping the Politics of Falsehood (Routledge Studies in Global 
Information, Politics and Society 2019) 5.  
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which ultimately comes to shape voter choices and therefore gives rise to situations 
wherein the voter is not able to exercise informed choice in the selection of election 
candidates. This weakens the foundational prong of Democracy.67  
IV. LEGAL REMEDIES: REGULATION OF FAKE NEWS   
A.  POWER TO REGULATE OR PROHIBIT FAKE NEWS 
The First question – whether State has the power to legislate in areas concerning 
cyber-space, information & SMP – is something that needs to be addressed in 
limine. Moreover, we need to look at the existing legal avenues through which 
Regulation of Fake News can be carried out. 
i.  PROHIBITING ‘FAKE NEWS’ – 69A OF THE IT ACT 
SMP are presently defined as ‘Intermediaries’ as per section 2(w) of the Information 
Technology Act 202068 (‘IT Act’). In India, they are exempted from liability of any 
third-party content that is shared on their platform by virtue of safe-harbour 
clause, i.e. Section 79 (2) of the IT Act.69 However, the Draft Information 
Technology70 (‘Intermediary Guidelines” Amendment Rules’) was formulated in 
2018 to amend laws to make social media and Internet Platforms accountable by 
introducing requirements like tracing out of originator of information for assistance 
to law enforcement, deployment of tools for filtering of unlawful content, takedown 
of illegal content within 24-hours. Additionally, section 69A of the IT Act is also 
employed by the State for blocking access to any information to the public as per the 
                                                                
67 See for e.g. James Hollyer and others, ‘Fake news is Bad news for Democracy' (The Washington Post April 
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grounds laid down therein.71 Recently, in the wake of farmer protests, Twitter 
withheld several accounts for allegedly making “false, provocative and intimidatory 
tweets” as per the Government Order under section 69A of the IT Act itself.72 
Therefore, section 69A of IT Act is one avenue that could be deployment by the State 
to prohibit the proliferation of ‘fake news’ on a case-to-case basis. 
ii.  CONCEPTION OF INTERNET – CHANNEL OF ‘INTERSTATE COMMERCE’ 
Another mechanism would be to compartmentalize Internet as a channel of 
interstate Commerce73 (legal fiction) and then arguably define SMP as ‘Internet-
based companies’ that engage in Interstate Commerce.74 Because the Internet is a 
channel, the Centre would be well within its powers75 to legislate on areas where 
online communications occur between individuals across different states via any 
medium.76 Furthermore, the apex Court in the Internet Shutdown case77, extensively 
discussed freedom of trade over the medium of Internet. Acknowledging and 
affirming the proliferation of neo-liberal capitalistic capillaries, the Court stressed 
upon the the role of Internet as a tool for trade and commerce pointing out that 
certain trade are completely dependant upon the Internet78 and held that that the 
Freedom of trade and commerce through the medium of Internet is protected under 
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Article 19 (1) (g). Once trade over Internet is afforded constitutional protection under 
Article 19(1) (g), then that freedom can be subjected to reasonable restrictions.79 
Based on the aforementioned categorization of SMP as ‘Internet-based companies’ 
that engage in Inter-state Commerce, they could be subjected to constitutionally 
permissible restrictions or prohibitions.80 In that case, proliferation of ‘fake news’ 
on SMP could then be considered as an instance of unfair and deceptive trade 
practice81 subject to the prescribed sanctions under the Consumer Protection Act, 
2019.82 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINE - RESTRICTIONS ON COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
By taking cues from the Central Hudson test from United States, ‘fake news’ can be 
likened to commercial speech for the Courts in India to develop a restrictive judicial 
doctrine.83 The Central Hudson test was a four-part test employed in the United 
States (‘U.S’) to determine whether any regulation on commercial speech violates 
the First Amendment. It involves the determination of four-prongs whether (1) 
speech is lawful and misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest in 
regulating the speech is substantial (3) whether the regulation directly advances the 
projected government interest; and (4) whether the government is no more 
extensive than necessary to achieve that interest.84 Hypothetically, if a judicial 
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doctrine is developed on lines of the Central Hudson test, any regulation that 
prohibits ‘fake news’ from being shared on social media would thereby pass the 
scrutiny of first prong of the test, although the satisfaction of other prongs would 
prove to be difficult.85 
C. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY - RESONABLE RESTRICTION TO FREE SPEECH AND 
EXPRESSION UNDER ARTICLE 19 
A plausible approach would be to subject ‘fake news’ to the scrutiny of the test of 
reasonable restriction under Article 19 that would require a claim other than 
defamation or incitement of offence.86 To punish ‘fake news’, a link of causality 
would need to be establibshed between speech in question and the harm that 
resulted.87 This would require empirical factual evidence that ‘fake news’ resulting 
in actual harm.88  Moreover the jurisprudence of Courts pertaining to the doctrine of 
reasonble restriction under Article 19 establish three requirements.89   
First, restriction on free speech and expression may include cases of prohibition.90 
Second, there should not be excessive burden on free speech even if a complete 
prohibition is imposed, and the government has to justify imposition of such 
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prohibition and explain as to why lesser alternatives would be inadequate.91 Thirdly, 
whether a restriction amounts to a complete prohibition is a question of fact, which 
is required to be determined by the Court with regard to the facts and circumstances 
of each case.92  
However, setting a precedent of Information Regulation by State could lead to the  
possibility of populist majoritarian governments taking control of thought and 
media when other viable approaches of regulating the information sphere is 
available.93 This approach seems paternalistic and borders on unconstitutional and 
undemocratic self-governance.94 A prescriptive legal approach would do more harm 
more than good when it comes to the regulation of ‘fake news’.  
V. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES - OVERVIEW 
Any attempt to curb fake news necessarily implies the regulation of SMP and 
therefore presents a host of challenges. On an abstract level, firstly it requires us to 
ponder over the concern whether is it possible for any piece of information to be 
completely objective? Is anything and everything not tainted with some prongs of 
ideology?  
Second, regulators have to overcome the barrier of the identification of ‘fake news’. 
Which entity should be responsible for this and whether a full proof technical 
solution is available or not? For the ascertainment of such concerns, we have to look 
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at the traditional regulatory approaches operating in the Cyber-Space. Traditional 
Regulatory approaches concerning cyber-space consist of :-95 
 Self-Regulation – SMP framing and enforcing their own voluntary content 
regulation policies or deploying techniques such as AI fact checking, engaging in 
reporting or flagging process.96 The absence of the involvement of the 
Government in the initiation or operation of the regulation is seen as the central 
tenet to the definition of self-regulation.97 Critics of this approach point out that 
since the ‘fake news’ phenomena is central to the business model of SMP, it 
would not be the interests of SMP to address it meaningfully. 98 
 Quasi-Regulation – Non-legal rules having an element of governmental 
imprints, that include government endorsed tech-industry codes of practice, 
agency guidance notes, industry custom agreements and accreditation 
schemes.99 
 Co-Regulation – It refers to a form of legislative delegation of power to enforce 
and regulate rules and codes, requiring the tech-industry to have a code and have 
powers to mandatorily or voluntarily prescribe one.100 However, this could have 
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the potential of having a “chilling effect” on anti-’fake news’ law on the freedom 
of online speech.101  
The Regulation of Social media poses considerable challenges for legislators and 
policymakers alike. Intrinsic to the growth of Internet has been the principle that it 
has always traditionally been open and accordingly the main concern with any 
interventionist approach vis-a-viz online communication is that such an approach 
is likely to be construed as a wedge; once regulators get their foot in the room, they 
will be pushing in with more and more rules.102 Any attempted ‘suppression’ of ‘fake 
news’ could have ancillary consequences of its restriction for protected truthful 
expression.103 The State should avoid a “first move” approach in order to prevent the 
inevitable “push”.104 The consequence of such an approach invariably could lead to 
Teubner’s Regulatory trilemma; the indifference of the ‘target’ system (i.e. 
cyberspace) to the intervention, the destruction of the ‘target’ system itself, or the 
destruction of the intervening system.105 This trilemma is based on the premise that 
unilateral intervention by any one single actor (for instance, the legislators) would 
impede the Regulatory objectives itself because across the cyberspace, the 
associated actors are restricted by the autonomy of others as well as the limitations 
of their own knowledge.106  
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The root of the problem can be traced to the fact that technology is normally global 
whereas law is essentially tied to a geographical location. Moreover, the various 
actors in the cyber-space can also viewed as nodes varying in their size, scalability 
and influence. Recently, a tweet from Elon Musk — an influential node asking users 
to switch to signal considerably boosted the sales of the messaging app.107 This 
shows that different nodes in the cyber-space have significant & variable impact 
over different stakeholders. Does that imply that we should have different 
prescriptive norms for different nodes or is even possible to regulate each and every 
node?108 Prescribing any regulatory norms for cyber space could also potentially lead 
to the relegation of these norms into the back-seat, particularly in light of their 
architectural technical codes that govern their realization.109 Moreover, the 
regulation of information over social media is also challenging due to the dynamic 
pace of changes in technology. 110  
VI. PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK – LESSIG’S ‘DECENTRED’ 
APPROACH TO REGULATION  
Due to the dynamic pace of changes in the cyber-sphere, the open, unguarded, 
virtual cyberspace requires a ‘Decentred’ Regulatory Design that takes us away from 
the traditional understanding where the State retains its monopoly on regulation, 
and instead places the locus of the activity of ‘regulation’ from State to other, 
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multiple locations, actors and across a range of instruments111. This is because the 
Cyber space consists of technical arrangements that constitute a world within 
themselves, generating their own norms, practices and perceptions.112  
A.  REGULATORY DESIGN & NORMATIVE APPROACH 
Any Regulatory Design has to be firstly responsive to the normative goals113 ; 
secondly decentred114 to the context in which the Internet operates and thirdly 
sensitive to the web of interactions and interdependencies operating between the 
social actors, and between the government and the social actors. The normative 
goals for the regulation of Internet should ensure that the regulatory approach takes 
into account the conditions for responsiveness, prevents entropy while stimulating 
system integration.115 For the determination of context around the regulation of 
Internet, there needs to be clarity in ascertainment whether SMP are neutral or 
deterministic or instrumentalistic or whether they are be construed as a value-laden 
sphere (means form a way of life that includes ends), or along the contours of 
substantivism (means and ends linked in systems) or else within the lens of critical 
theory (choice of alternative means-ends systems).116 Once a conception of SMP has 
been effectively agreed, the next step involves the assignment of the roles of the 
different Intervening Agents.  
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B.  ROLES OF INTERVENING AGENTS 
SMP involve the interplay of law, norms, market and architecture, and therefore 
require clear prescriptive demarcation with respect to the roles played by each of 
these elements. Lessig’s delineation of these roles, in his seminal Code of Law117, is 
especially relevant when we want to delve into the Regulatory approaches and 
challenges dealing with the regulation of information.- 
Law – A positivist role of law, i.e. respond to clear and imminent threats. For 
instance, a legislation could prevent the different forms of surveillance. The 
objective of law could be to enhance the power of individuals to control the usage of 
data about them, or to disable such subversive use of power.118  
Norms – Norms could be deployed to enable trusts around certain practices.119 For 
example, the six data protection principles — purpose limitation120, access 
limitation, data minimisation121, storage limitation, fairness and transparency, 
integrity and confidentiality exhibit the same.  
Markets – Markets could be used to protect the privacy of individuals. 
Architecture/Code – Architecture of technologies could be deployed to protect 
privacy.122 There are technologies designed to ensure the user gets more control over 
the data associated with him or her.123 
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C.  DYNAMIC WORKING OF FRAMEWORK: LESSING’S REGULATORY HARBOUR MODEL 
Lessig employed Regulatory theory as a backdrop in the contextual setting of SMP 
by formulating a ‘responsive regulatory’ which is based on a software development 
model.124 This Framework is congruent with the dynamic technological environment 
of the Internet, the differential nature of logics, and the institutional practices of 
regulator and regulated in India. It serves as a viable model that is both flexible and 
robust alike and thus is the most appropriate for the Indian Regulatory Regime for 
Information Regulation. 125  
i.  THEORETICAL BASIS OF MODEL  - FOUCAULT’S CIRCLE OF DESKS 
The Regulatory Harbour model is based on Foucault’s Circle(s) of Desks.126 This 
hypothetical is essentially an enclosed arrangement of students that creates closed 
circular spaces.127 By altering the accepted arrangement of students, seated in rows 
and columns into a series of small groups, we decrease the student’s power and 
enhance teacher’s domination over them by partitioning them and pinning them 
down in smaller units. This arrangement of students in smaller circles, and by the 
act of walking up and down, the teacher gets greater visibility and scrutiny of 
students. Moreover, the circle of desks also allows the teacher to deploy the students 
as supplementary and reinforcing gazes to their own. This arrangement forces the 
student to lock themselves each other into a grid of increased visibility ensuring 
intersecting observations. The students cannot possibly hide if they are unprepared, 
or doing other work, or bored because they are observing each other aside from 
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being observed by the teacher. This arrangement has the intended effect of altering 
the existing power distribution cycle. 
Along similar lines, the Regulatory framework concerning social media should 
model Foucault’s circle of desks with the obvious exception of the presence of school 
teacher. In crude terms, the framework should ensure that the associated actors, i.e. 
(organs, of state, policy-makers, technology developers as well as SMP) are 
arranged in a grid of reinforced gazes. Each actor keeps a check on each other and 
this ensures that the power structure remains decentralized. 
ii.  AN ITERATIVE AND DYNAMIC MODEL 
Normatively, this diagrammatic or conceptual arrangement when applied to the 
representation of technological regulatory architecture would highlight the 
‘arrangement of individuals’ in relation to one another, of hierarchal organisation, 
of orientation of centres and outlets of power. What is imperative is that such a 
framework would ensure that SMP move away from the traditional outcome-based 
focus of social media panopticon towards the integration of the limitations of 
technological architecture.128 The Regulatory framework should also employ a 
holistic and iterative approach to the design of the regulatory architecture.129 The 
Road-map for the framework should prioritise technological architectural 
requirements, which should take precedence over iterations of prescriptive 
solutions used to achieve the applicable legal principles.130 The objective should be 
iterative evolution and not prescriptive revolutions that takes into account the 
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institutional environments in which the regulators act.131 The framework should 
incorporate the following features:- 
Firstly, core principles (freedom of expression, privacy concerns) must be designed 
and/or drafted into the vision of regulation.132 Broad wording of regulations that is 
backed by teeth through enforceable sanctions will ensure that the scope of these 
principle is respected.133 
Secondly, the technology developer community must be considered on how to 
deliver the outcome balancing the competing interests between achieving business 
objectives and meeting regulatory requirements.134 
Thirdly, a ‘consultation panel’ should be established comprising of SMP providers 
and policy-makers (well-versed with the functioning of social-media platforms) to 
develop a common language about risk and to facilitate learning.135  
The proposed solutions should then be modulated to balance government’s 
priorities and human rights obligations taking into account the industrial risks such 
as cost, complexity, delivery. 
iii.  FUNCTIONING OF THE ITERATIVE REGULATORY MODEL 
Any foundational principle (e.g. principle of proportionality) has to be read in 
consideration of different legal issues (e.g. criminal liability, privacy infringement, 
defamation, trolling, sedition) implying that there will an intermingling of various 
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rules and principles.136 However, Lessig proposes that across the different sub-legal 
terrains, they should become less prescriptive.137 During each iteration, the role of 
regulator is not to come up with more prescriptions but to clarify those 
prescriptions.138 Once the different stakeholders have built consensus, then the 
policy/prescription can be released, in a way that has allowed the platform providers 
to consider architecture issues prior to implementation to the regulation.139 As and 
when the draft legislation is prepared, information campaigns, guidance notes, 
stakeholder consultation should be undertaken to improve the design and 
implementation of principles. Such iterative model ensures considerable flexibility 
and, if there is hurdle at any stage of the process, there is an inlet that can be fallen 
back on.140 Unlike the traditional drafting model, wherein an intolerable strain would 
be placed on the legislation (for instance, Draft Data Protection Bill) seeking to 
contain the dynamic technological environment, there is always a pressure-release 
system that can accommodate dynamisms of the environment.141 
Lessig’s Regulatory Harbour Model is the applicable Regulatory solution that can 
respond to attitudinal setting, institutionalisation and private sector’s interests, 
creating flexible models responsive to change.142 Such a model has the potential of 
curbing dynamic and ever-evolving issues associated with the cyber-space, 
especially for tackling the dissemination and proliferation of ‘fake news’.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
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SMP have led to the emergence to an ethos that have led to the emergence and 
proliferation of ‘fake news’. This has undermined the foundational imprints of the 
Rule of Law and eclipsed Democracy across the globe. Exploitation of psychological 
drives, promotion of neo-liberal logics of control, mitigation of objective truth and 
collapse of traditional narratives and institutions are the key reasons that make 
regulation of SMP imperative. What is at stake is the Factual Reality itself! As 
indicted in my analysis, the power to regulate social media can be sufficiently 
derived from the Constitution of India. However, the dynamic pace of changes in the 
cyber-sphere would make any static prescriptive-principled based approach to the 
regulation of SMP obsolete.  Therefore, any Regulatory prescription that hopes to 
counter the proliferation of ‘fake news’ has to employ a Decentred approach to 
Regulation. This make Lessig’s Regulatory Harbour Model as the preferred 
Regulatory framework, which bears the potential to curb dynamic and ever-
evolving issues associated with the cyber-space. Moreover any Regulatory 
framework with the objective of countering ‘fake news’ has to combat two over-
arching & elusive issues —its definition leading to its identification. Till date, it has 
not been easy to lay down a definition of ‘fake news’. At the moment, there is no 
clear and shared definition of ‘fake news’.143 Moreover, there is also absence of a 
fool-proof technological solution for the precise identification of Fake News. 
Therefore, let us be hopeful that any Regulatory approach towards SMP represents 
a deep need for freedom, openness and restoration in the ideal of the Rule of Law 
because the coming future with potential for information-acceleration and 
transfiguration, remains highly uncertain, as it always has. 
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